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Abstract
The Preˆt a` Voter cryptographic voting system was
designed to be flexible and to offer voters a famil-
iar and easy voting experience. In this paper we
present a case study of our efforts to adapt Preˆt a`
Voter to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Aus-
tralian state of Victoria. The general background
and desired user experience have previously been de-
scribed; here we concentrate on the cryptographic
protocols for dealing with some unusual aspects of
Victorian voting. We explain the problems, present
solutions, then analyse their security properties and
explain how they tie in to other design decisions. We
hope this will be an interesting case study on the ap-
plication of end-to-end verifiable voting protocols to
real elections.
1 Introduction
End-to-end verifiable election protocols are well stud-
ied in the academic literature, but until recently have
not been deployed in public elections. In 2011 the
Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) approached
the Preˆt a` Voter team to investigate adapting the
scheme to the special requirements of the Victorian
parliamentary elections, which use both (single-seat)
IRV and 5-seat STV1. The first prototypes are avail-
able at the time of writing and the development of
production systems is underway. Trials on small scale
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1For more information on various election methods, please
refer to the appendix in [XCH+10].
by-elections are expected in 2013, with the goal of
having the system ready for the next Victorian State
election in November 2014.
The proposed protocol is universally verifiable,
meaning that there are no trust assumptions for
guaranteeing the integrity of the votes.2 There are
probabilistic assumptions about the number of vot-
ers who audit some Preˆt a` Voter ballots, the number
who check that their printout matches their intended
vote, and the number who read the Web Bulletin
Board (WBB). It also provides voters with evidence
of malfeasance, assuming that they check the signa-
ture on their receipt before they leave the polling sta-
tion.
Since this is a polling-station scheme, we do not
address eligibility verifiability. Prevention of ballot
stuffing is by existing procedural mechanisms.
The main departure from standard Preˆt a` Voter
is the use of a computer to assist the user in com-
pleting the ballot. This necessitates trusting that
device for vote privacy, which is different from stan-
dard Preˆt a` Voter in which the voter does not need
to communicate her vote to any (encryption) device.
This modification is necessary for usability, because
a vote can consist of a permuted list of about 30 can-
didates. It seemed infeasible for a voter to fill in a
Preˆt a` Voter ballot form without assistance. Indeed,
simply filling in an ordinary paper ballot with about
30 preferences is a difficult task. About 2% of vot-
ers accidentally disenfranchise themselves by incor-
rectly filling in their vote. Computerised assistance
is an important benefit of the project, and trusting
the device for privacy seemed an almost unavoidable
result of that usability advantage.3 Hence our scheme
depends on stronger privacy assumptions than stan-
2Vision impaired voters must assume that at least one de-
vice reads accurately to them.
3In principle one could use an EBM to fill in a series of
ballots and only cast one of them, without telling the device
which one. This is too much work for voters.
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dard Preˆt a` Voter. Providing privacy for complex
ballots is notoriously difficult, and is further compli-
cated by some details of Victorian elections that are
described below. Our system provides privacy and
receipt-freeness under reasonable assumptions about
the correct randomised generation and careful dele-
tion of secret data, and of course assuming a thresh-
old of decryption key sharers do not collude. It does
not fully defend against the “Italian Attack,” or all
other subtle coercion issues, but neither does the cur-
rent paper-based system. We make this more precise
below.
1.1 Challenges of Victorian Voting
Preˆt a` Voter was designed originally for first-past-
the post voting, in which each voter chose a single
candidate [CRS05]. Subsequent papers extended the
scheme to more complex types of elections [RS06,
Rya08, RBH+09, XCH+10]. However, the state of
Victoria, like many other Australian states, allows
voters a sort of hybrid between single-choice and
ranked-choice voting. Each citizen can vote for both
a single representative in the Legislative Assembly
(LA) and a set of representatives in the Legisla-
tive Council (LC). Each LA representative is elected
by IRV with compulsory complete preference listing,
with rarely more than 10 candidates. Voters for the
Legislative Council (LC) typically choose from among
about 30 candidates. They may cast either a stan-
dard STV vote of optional length (at least 5, and up
to all preferences), or a single selection of a politi-
cal group. Each political group (of which there are
about 12) sets a (complete) STV vote which becomes
the meaning of all votes cast for that group. Tra-
ditionally, both voting options are presented on the
same ballot paper. The single-group selections are
presented on top of a thick line, and are referred to
as “above-the-line” voting (LC-ATL); the full STV
options are shown below the line (LC-BTL).
Each polling place must accept votes from a resi-
dent of anywhere in the state. Hence our system must
produce Preˆt a` Voter ballots for every electoral divi-
sion in both the LA and the LC, available at every
polling place. This is a significant challenge for Preˆt
a` Voter, but Preˆt a` Voter confers the great advantage
of verifiability on these votes. The existing methods
of verifiable paper counting do not work with this re-
quirement. For the large fraction of people who vote
outside their home electorate, completed paper bal-
lots must be sent to the home electorate by courier,
usually arriving after the polling-station count has
been completed and after observers have departed.
This system will not be responsible for all of the
votes cast in the upcoming state election, so it will
have to combine with existing procedures for casting
and counting ordinary paper ballots. For LA and LC-
ATL votes this is straightforward. However, LC-BTL
votes are complicated. Even those cast on paper must
be tallied electronically—in the existing system they
are manually entered and then electronically tallied.
The authorities then publish complete vote data to
allow observers to check the count.4
Preferential elections are vulnerable to coercion
through signature attacks [DC07], commonly referred
to as Italian attacks, as discussed in Appendix A.
The system proposed here does not address this at-
tack, primarily because it will work alongside a paper
system that is also susceptible to it. Our system also
reveals whether a person voted ATL or BTL. This is
unlikely to have political consequences.
Another challenge is producing an accesible solu-
tion for voters who cannot fill out a paper ballot
unassisted. This is a primary justification for the
project, but producing a truly verifiable solution for
such voters is extremely difficult, because many of
them cannot perform the crucial check that the print-
out matches their intention (though see [CHPV09]
for a verifiable and accessible protocol). We pro-
vide a way for them to use any other machine in the
polling place to do the check, in which case the cast-
as-intended property depends upon at least one of the
machines in the polling station not colluding with the
others to manipulate the vote.
1.2 Related Work
In the USA, voter verifiable paper trails with audit-
ing (VVPAT) are a common means of achieving soft-
ware independence. However, this does not solve the
problem of secure custody and transport of the paper
trail described above. Furthermore, performing rig-
orous risk-limiting audits seems intractable for IRV
[MRSW11, Car11], let alone for 30-candidate STV.
The most closely related project is the ground-
breaking use of Scantegrity II in binding local gov-
ernment elections in Takoma Park, MD [CCC+10].
Our project has very similar privacy and verifiability.
However, both the number of votes and the complex-
ity of each ballot are greater for our system. Ob-
viously we are describing a proposal for a system,
4These procedures are also under review and improvement,
but are out of the scope of this paper.
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while the Takoma Park project has already happened.
Although the Scantegrity II scheme appears to have
been highly successful in the context of the Takoma
Park elections, we decided that Preˆt a` Voter was more
appropriate than Scantegrity II for our application.
Scantegrity II is inherently for single-candidate selec-
tions. It has been adapted to IRV in Takoma Park
by running a separate single-candidate election for
each preference, but would be difficult to adapt to
30-candidate preference lists. Even with computer
assistance, a 30 by 30 grid of invisible ink bubbles
seems too complicated for most voters.
Wombat [RTsRBN], VoteBox [SDW08] and sev-
eral other polling-station end-to-end verifiable voting
schemes guarantee integrity by using “Benaloh chal-
lenges,” [Ben06] which require filling in the vote more
than once. This would be time-consuming for 30-
candidate STV. It would perhaps be possible to make
challenges easier (for example, by letting the device
remember the last vote), but the integrity guarantees
still depend on the voter performing quite a subtle
randomised protocol. We have opted for Preˆt a` Voter,
in which voters may audit the unvoted ballot form.
This audit is independent of the vote size and can
be completed with assistance without compromising
privacy. It also provides full accountability: there is
no need to take the voter’s word for how they voted.
1.3 Prior work and paper overview
In a previous paper [BCH+12] we gave an overview of
this project, including the context of Victorian voting
and some ideas about how we would implement the
protocol.
Here we present all of the protocol, including both
the cryptographic protocol and the human proce-
dures to be followed in the polling place and at the
electoral commission. Our aim is for a comprehen-
sive analysis of the protocol’s security, including the
assumptions on which privacy depends, a precise ex-
planation of the kind of verifiability achieved, and a
clear statement of the issues that remain.
The next section provides a detailed protocol de-
scription, including both human and cryptographic
elements; the final section contains a preliminary
threat analysis. A more comprehensive and rigor-
ous threat analysis will be performed as the details
of the design, including surrounding procedures etc,
are finalised.
2 Protocol description
The main roles for computers are:
• the web bulletin board (WBB), a broadcast
channel with memory,
• candidate list mixers who generate ballot in-
formation,
• candidate list key sharers who deliver ballot
information to printers.
• printers who print ballots,
• electronic ballot markers (EBMs) who mark
votes onto ballots,
• vote mixers who shuﬄe votes, and
• election key sharers who share the key used
to decrypt votes at the end of the election.
In practice we will use the same set of servers for
mixing and decryption, so the election key sharers
will be the same as the vote mixers, and likewise
the candidate-list key sharers will be the same as the
candidate-list mixers. These roles are explained be-
low.
2.1 Ballot Form
The ballot form is a 240× 120mm card with a perfo-
ration down the middle. The front face (as shown in
Figure 1) lists the LA section as well as the LC-ATL
section, while the back face (shown in Figure 3 of Ap-
pendix A) lists the LC-BTL section. The ballot on
each face is upside down with respect to the other.
On both faces, the right hand side (RHS) lists the
candidate/party names and the left hand side (LHS)
allows the voter to mark her choices. Because both
the LA and the LC-BTL sections are using ranked
elections, the candidate list on the ballot for these
two sections needs to be randomly permuted rather
than just cyclic shifted. Otherwise, the LHS with the
ranking choices will reveal too much information. For
example, if adversaries know a voter’s most/least fa-
vorate candidate, then they can figure out this voter’s
other preferences.
Each ballot has a serial number on the LHS. More-
over, in the LHS of the ballot form, there is an en-
crypted value, called an “onion”, associated with each
candidate. If an onion is properly decrypted, it will
represent the corresponding candidate in the RHS.
However, the onions are not directly printed on the
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Check your preferences
online at
VEC.VIC.GOV.AU/WBB2014
Your code is:  NTH:1
Figure 1: A slip example—the front face
ballot. Instead, they are recorded on the WBB, and
there is a QR code on the LHS front face of the bal-
lot to refer to the corresponding onions. On the front
face of the ballot form, there is another QR code in
the RHS which records the permutation of the can-
didate ordering of the entire ballot. Each QR code
merely reproduces in machine-readable form exactly
the information that is available in human-readable
form on the same side of the ballot.
We now describe how the onions are constructed
in different sections of the ballot form. In this paper,
we use Eˆpk(m) to denote that m is encrypted using
exponential ElGamal, and Epk(m) denotes that m is
encrypted using normal ElGamal.
For the LA section, we use the Baudron counter
[CFSY96, BFP+01, BCH+12] to encode these onions
as follows: suppose there are k candidates in the LA
election, we first select a value M where M > k (e.g.
M = k+1). Then we associate M0 with the first can-
didate in the ballot draw order, M1 with the second
candidate, and so on. The onion for the i-th candi-
date will be encrypted using the exponential ElGamal
cipher as Eˆpk(M
i−1) = (gM
i−1
yr, gr). This allows us
to absorb all these onions as well as their associated
preferential rankings into a single ciphertext using
the homomorphic property. Hence it will speed up
the tallying process.
For the LC-ATL section, we simply select a
value in Gq to represent each party/group name,
and the onion is encrypted using the ElGamal
cipher Epk(m) = (my
r, gr). For example, if
α, β, γ are values in Gq to represent the parties
A,B, C respectively, their corresponding onions will
be Epk(α), Epk(β), Epk(γ).
For the LC-BTL section, we use the Baudron
counter again to encode the onions. Suppose there
are l candidates in the LC-BTL section, we select a
value L where L > l (e.g. L = l + 1). Then we
associate L0 with the first candidate in the ballot
draw order, L1 with the second candidate, and so on.
The onion for the j-th candidate will be encrypted
as Eˆpk(L
j−1) = (gL
j−1
yr, gr). However, we will show
in a later section that the tallying method for this
section has to be slightly different.
2.2 Ballot Generation
In Preˆt a` Voter, privacy depends on maintaining the
secrecy of the candidate order that corresponds to
a particular receipt. Since a printer actually has to
print both sides of the form, and hence can recog-
nise the receipt subsequently and recall the candidate
order, privacy depends on very strong assumptions
about the printer’s data being properly generated and
destroyed. We emphasise that this affects privacy,
not integrity, because the correctness of printing can
be audited.
Ballot generation must satisfy two main require-
ments:
• The ballot’s candidate ordering and the values
used for encryption must be random and not gen-
erated by any single party. (Otherwise a mali-
cious printer can use the receipt to leak informa-
tion about the votes via a kleptographic attack
[GKK+06].)
• As much as feasible, the ballot’s random data,
and the plaintext candidate list corresponding
to each RHS, must be secret.
We will use the distributed ballot generation of
[RT10], in which the candidate list mixers succes-
sively shuﬄe a list of encrypted candidate names for
each vote. This protocol guarantees the first condi-
tion above if at least one participant is honest. This
produces a list of encrypted ballots on the WBB,
each one consisting of a serial number, the list of
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LHS onions, and the corresponding list of encrypted
candidates for the printer together with a proof of
correspondence. The printers’ candidate lists are en-
crypted under a threshold key shared across a set of
candidate list key sharers, distinct from the election
key sharers. Thus no individual server can obtain the
cleartext candidate lists.
It is not strictly necessary to make the election key
sharers and candidate list key sharers distinct. Note
however that there are two distinct modes of oper-
ation here: threshold decryption for ballot printing
and audit (on a per ballot basis) on the one hand, and
tabulation mixing/decryption on the other (a batch
operation). Even though the capabilities required are
the same, it seems wise to assign these to separate en-
tities to make mode confusion less likely.
Although some possibilities exist for distributing
the printing step [ECHA09], these are not mature
enough to use yet.
Printers obtain the candidate list by means of
blinding [Cha82], using a protocol similar to that of
[ZMSR05] but with the printer generating the blind-
ing factor. We outline it as follows: to obtain a list for
printing, the printer encrypts a blinding factor under
the candidate list public key, and passes it, with a
proof of knowledge, to the list server which combines
it with the encrypted list. The resulting blinded list
is decrypted and passed back to the printer, which
removes the blinding factor to obtain and print the
candidate list.
2.3 The Voting Ceremony
2.3.1 Casting a vote
The voter presents herself to an official at a polling
station and her name is marked off a register. The
official sends the print station a request for a ballot
of the appropriate LA and LC division. The print
station runs the protocol with the WBB to retrieve
the candidate permutation for the assigned look-up
code. It then prints the ballot. It is important that
no-one except the voter sees the association between
the candidate order and serial number on the ballot,
so printing should be private.
Check 1: Confirming ballot correctness.
Once she has obtained her ballot, she should decide
whether she wishes to run a confirmation check on it
or use it to vote. A confirmation check, called “au-
diting” in previous versions of Preˆt a` Voter, means
checking that the encrypted list of candidates on the
WBB matches the plaintext candidate ordering on
the RHS of the ballot. In our version the QR codes
must be checked too. Ballot confirmation ensures
that the ballot is well-formed and hence would cor-
rectly encode a vote. We describe the ballot confir-
mation procedure below in Section 2.3.2. She can re-
peat the ballot confirmation procedure as many times
as she wants, each time obtaining a fresh ballot, until
proceeding to vote using the last obtained, unaudited
ballot. This implements an iterated cut-and-choose
protocol: not knowing which option the voter will
choose before committing to the printed ballot serves
to counter any attempts by the system to manipu-
late votes by issuing mal-formed ballots. Confirming
ballot construction necessarily reveals encryption in-
formation, so a ballot that has been confirmed should
not be subsequently re-used for voting.
Assuming that she is now happy to proceed to cast-
ing her vote, the voter takes the last obtained ballot
to the booth. In standard Preˆt a` Voter she would
now proceed to fill in her preferences directly on the
ballot. However, given that the LC-BTL section con-
tains about 30 candidates, it is not reasonable to ex-
pect the voter to enter her ranking preferences using
a permuted candidate list. Instead we propose to
use a touch screen Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM)
that will display the candidates in standard order, as
previously introduced in [BCH+12]. The voter enters
her preferences via the screen in the standard way, the
EBM will take care of the permutation as we will see
shortly. This means that we have to sacrifice one of
the pleasing features of standard Preˆt a` Voter: that
no device directly learns the voter’s choices. This
seems unavoidable for such expressive ballots if the
system is to be usable.
She inserts the ballot into the EBM and selects her
preferred language and can run through a training
module on the machine to learn about the whole vot-
ing procedure, verification and tallying. The voter is
now offered the choice of sequence in which she votes
that is, the Legislative Assembly (LA) or Legislative
Council ballots, and for the latter she can vote either
“above the line” (ATL) or “below the line” (BTL).
For the LA ballot, there is also a “how to vote card”
option if she wishes.5 Note that although the voter
can vote at any polling station, the LA ballot is spe-
cific to the region in which she is registered. She must
however, fill in both a LA and LC ballot and will be
prompted by the EBM to ensure that she does this.6
5This is an opportunity for candidates to give their sup-
porters helpful recommendations on how to arrange their other
preferences.
6Exact rules on ballot spoiling are yet to be specified. This
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For each ballot (LA or LC), the EBM scans the
the QR code which represents the permutation of the
candidate ordering on her ballot and displays the can-
didates in canonical order. Once the voter enters her
choices, she is asked to confirm her choices and when
she does so they are overprinted on the LHS of the
ballot. Note that the EBM knows the permutation
on the ballot and so re-orders the voter’s selection
accordingly.
Check 2: EBM vote printing. The voter should
check that the overprinting matches the preferences
she told the EBM. Note also that the EBM can assist
the voter by pointing out syntactic errors, for exam-
ple, duplicate rankings etc.
Once both the LA and LC ballots are complete,
the voter extracts the ballot from the EBM and sep-
arates the left and right sides of the ballot. To ensure
receipt-freeness, she must insert the RHS in a disposal
bin as without the candidate order on her ballot, she
cannot later prove how she voted.
The voter takes the LHS to the scanner and scans
both faces. The scanner submits the preferences and
the look-up QR code to the WBB, which registers
the vote, generates a hash value of the received in-
formation and sends the digital signature of the hash
value back to the scanner. The scanner now over-
prints the signed hash as a further QR code onto the
LHS, which can be taken away by the voter as her
receipt.
Check 3: Signature. The voter can check the
signature using a purpose-built smart phone app
or on-site services provided by helper organisations.
This must of course incorporate a check that the data
signed by the WBB is the same as the data printed
on the paper.
The voter is easily able to produce multiple copies
of her receipt, either using a photocopier or because
they are automatically printed by the scanner. This
combats the “trash attack,” [BL11] and also allows
others to check her recipt on the WBB.
Check 4: Receipt appears on WBB. After a
given time period, the voter can use her receipt to
check that the information is correctly recorded on
the WBB.
is a matter of user interface: voters could easily be allowed
to cast incomplete or invalid preference lists, as long as they
are warned. The receipts would then reveal their decision to
spoil their ballot. Alternatively, there could be a candidate
called “spoiled ballot” who would be the first preference of any
invalid ballot. Subsequent preferences would be meaningless,
but could be filled in to make the receipt look like that of a
valid vote.
We now describe the ballot confirmation process in
more detail.
2.3.2 Confirming ballot correctness
To perform Check 1, confirming ballot correctness,
the ballot can be taken back to the printer.7 The
candidate list key-sharers are asked to decrypt the
candidate list directly, and to publish a proof of de-
cryption. The WBB must also be notified that the
ballot has been audited, and therefore not to accept
any vote cast with that ballot form. As part of the
confirmation process, a clear “AUDITED—NOT TO
BE USED TO VOTE” message (which must be visi-
ble on the LHS) is printed on the ballot form.
The voter can also check the proof of decryption
later on any other machine, including at home, so we
are not trusting the polling-place machines for con-
firmation of ballot construction.
When the day’s bulletin board becomes available
(see Section 2.5), it shows which serial numbers were
audited and displays a proof of what the candidate
ordering should be. (It also shows which ones were
voted and what the preferences were.)
Ensuring the mutual exclusion of audited and cast
ballots is vitally important. There must be a realtime
check that the same ballot is not both audited and
voted. The entity that does this (which could be
the printer, or the tellers, or the WBB, depending
on exactly how the CTs are opened) is trusted for
privacy, but not for integrity because violations are
detectable.
2.3.3 Resolving disputes
We have not specified exactly what happens when
any of these checks fail. It is challenging in any
voting system to recover from errors. A failure of
check 1, 3 or 4 is immediately demonstrable (assum-
ing Check 3 is performed on the spot in the polling
place) and proves malfeasance by election authorities.
This would have serious implications for the trustwor-
thiness of the election result. It is less clear how se-
riously to regard a failure of Check 2. Unfortunately
there will be some rate of false alarms, in which voters
claim their vote was misrecorded when they simply
misremembered it or changed their minds. Hence a
zero-tolerance policy is unworkable, even though any
tolerance increases the chances for vote manipulation.
Whatever the level of tolerance, it is important that
7A scanner with printing facilities would also work.
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ballots spoiled in this way remain secret, or the pro-
cess can introduce opportunities for coercion.
2.4 The Voting Ceremony—the case
for vision impaired voters
2.4.1 Casting a vote
We assume that the vision-impaired voter has regis-
tered at a polling place and had her name marked
off. The voter should be able to print her ballot
by following the procedure documented in the pre-
vious section, assuming that the printing device is
accessible. As before, printing needs to be private to
ensure confidentiality of the RHS. Notice (Figure 1)
that the slip has a clipped corner on the lower LHS.
This is to assist correct insertion into the device for
overprinting, as described shortly.
The vision impaired voter takes the slip to an Elec-
tronic Ballot Marker (EBM). At the EBM, she inserts
the slip, clipped corner first. The system is set so that
she has an audio-only session in her preferred lan-
guage and the touch screen is laid out like a keypad.
For example, the four corners when touched render
1, 3, ∗ and #, the middle top and bottom give 2 and
0, and so on.
The session is similar to the one described previ-
ously in Section 2.3 in that the voter has to fill in bal-
lots for her LA and LC (ATL/BTL) votes, but this
time she indicates her choices by touching the appro-
priate parts of the screen and has voice prompts to
guide her. When she had filled in all required parts
of the slip, she is given a voice confirmation of her
vote choices and if she agrees with them, she can fin-
ish the voting part of the ceremony by touching the
designated part of the screen.
She then inserts the form into the device which
overprints her choices on the LHS of the slip.
This voter is unable to perform by sight the crucial
check that the overprinted values match her intended
vote. Hence she may take her form (with both sides
still joined) to another EBM8 which scans the RHS
QR code and the printed preferences, and reads her
vote back to her. In this case we are trusting for
8This represents the ideal scenario. In practice it may be
too hard to equip every EBM with an OCR enabled scanner,
so we may have to either use the ballot-submission scanner for
this purpose, or use a dedicated machine. Using the ballot-
submission scanner is not ideal because it is online, so should
preferably not learn the contents of votes. Of course, the voter
could also ask for assistance from a sighted person, but that
would compromise her privacy and defeat most of the purpose
of using this system.
integrity that she can find at least one EBM in the
polling place that does not collude with the first one
she used.
By this point we can be confident that the printed
preferences match the voter’s intentions. She then
separates the two sides of the slip down the lengthwise
perforation and destroys the RHS. As before, the LHS
is scanned and the WBB returns a signed hash of the
vote information which is printed on the receipt.
The EBMs could also speak the preference orders
on the slip so the voter can note them down (with a
blind note-taker device or with memory), and likewise
the ScanStation could speak the numbers it reads and
submits. This helps the voter to check the ScanSta-
tion unassisted but does not really affect privacy or
verifiability because she must still check that her vote
is printed as she requested, and recorded on the WBB
as it is printed, rather than trusting the EBM and
scanner to tell her the truth. She could do the WBB
check with assistance from a print reader or from a
sighted person without jeopardising privacy.
Note that the only steps that need to be private
are the mark-up by the EBM and check with a second
EBM. All the other verification steps: confirmation of
the ballot, confirmation of the receipt signature and
of correct posting of the receipt to the WBB can be
performed with assistance without jeopardising ballot
privacy.
If she has performed a confirmation check on a bal-
lot, the voter can still go home and use her screen-
or print-reader, with the same confirmation-checking
software as everyone else, to make sure her candidate
list matches the onion. The only important detail is
that she has to make sure she knows what the clear-
text candidate order is. She must either ask several
people or use (a) print reader(s). Neither of these im-
pacts upon privacy: there are no privacy implications
for anyone in confirming ballots.
2.5 The Web Bulletin Board
A number of voting schemes require some form of
append-only Web Bulletin Board (WBB). However,
specific details of how to design or implement such a
service are often lacking. In this section we do not
aim to propose a generic WBB, only to define one
that will work within the constraints we have and
offer the properties we need. We will approach the
problem from a pragmatic point of view and rather
than try and define a service that provides the prop-
erties itself, we will define a process that provides the
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same assurances. The fundamental requirements we
have of a WBB are
• that every observer gets the same information,
and
• that the data written to it cannot be changed or
deleted without detection.
We assume that when the voter submits their
choices to the WBB, the WBB creates a digital sig-
nature of the choices and returns it to the voter. The
voter then checks the validity of the signature and
that the contents match the choices that were sub-
mitted. Initially we will only discuss a single WBB,
we will discuss later how this creates a robustness as-
sumption, but does not directly impact on integrity.
Unlike some previous proposals for a WBB, the WBB
we utilise will not be accessible to the public during
the run of the election. At the close of the election
the WBB commits to its contents by constructing a
hash of it and digitally signing it. This hash is then
distributed to public organisations and media outlets.
At this point all the data is also accessible and those
organisations are free to verify that the hash is correct
and the signature is valid. Likewise, a voter is free to
perform those checks should they wish to. Following
this commitment the WBB becomes accessible to the
public for them to verify the receipts they have and
check that their votes are included in the hash.
If an adversary, or even the WBB itself, attempts to
delete or modify the data following the commitment
it will be detected when the hash values do not match.
If an attempt is made to delete or modify the data
prior to the commitment it will be detected when the
voters verify their receipts on the WBB. A key point
here is that information cannot be removed from the
WBB after a voter has checked that it is present. It
is worthwhile noting that this assumes a significant
enough number of people do verify their receipts. We
do not have to trust the WBB for integrity or pri-
vacy. We do have an assumption that the WBB is
robust. The loss of data would potentially result in
the election having to be re-run.
Due to the nature of the election, and the early
voting phase lasting two weeks, we need to address
the practicality of the WBB running for that period
and the reasonableness of asking voters to wait two
weeks to check their vote on the WBB. To mitigate
against this problem we will make a commitment of
the contents of the WBB on a nightly basis. This
will allow the WBB to potentially be shutdown and
maintained overnight when no voting is taking place.
It additionally allows voters to check the presence of
their vote, in the committed list, at most 24 hours
after they cast their vote. From an abstract point of
view this can be thought of as if we have an individual
WBB for each day and the votes submitted to the
mix-net are the combination of all the WBBs, which
can be verified via the previously made commitments.
Similarly, it may be impractical to expect voters
to download the entire WBB contents in order to re-
compute the hash. This could easily be addressed by
generating a hash tree and publishing the root, then
giving each individual their list of neighbours. They
would recompute the hashes along their branch and
this would demonstrate the inclusion of their vote.
The WBB will be in operation prior to the start
of voting, in order for generated ciphers and various
audit data to be submitted and stored on it in prepa-
ration for the election. It seems sensible for the WBB
to make an initial commitment, prior to the start of
the election, which can then be used to verify that
the lookup data and ciphers have remained on the
WBB throughout.
2.5.1 Further work
As we mentioned above, with a single WBB we are
making a robustness assumption and are particularly
dependent on voters checking their receipts on the
WBB, neither of which is ideal. We have investi-
gated a number of different approaches and present
one possible approach here. To improve the robust-
ness we could construct a distributed, peered, WBB.
It will operate almost identically to the single WBB
except the digital signature will be a threshold sig-
nature. When a vote is submitted to the WBB it is
sent to all peers simultaneously. Each peer constructs
its individual share of the signature and distributes
it to the other peers. Once a peer has the threshold
number of signature shares it can combine them and
return it to the voter on their receipt. This improves
the robustness assumption, since we no longer need
to assume a single machine remains online and intact,
we just need to assume a threshold number of peers
remain intact. Due to the redundancy in the data
it may also be possible to bring a peer back online
following an attack or failure and for that peer to be
able to verify it has a valid copy of the data.
Whilst having a peered WBB does not directly
change the integrity assumptions, it may impact on
the assumptions the voter ends up having. To this de-
gree the assumptions the voter has to make reduce,
the more work they do:
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1. If the voter casts their ballot and does not check
the receipt or signature they have an integrity
assumption on the equipment in the polling sta-
tion and the WBB.
2. If the voter verifies their receipt in the polling
station they have an integrity assumption on the
WBB.
3. If the voter checks the WBB later on they are
free from any integrity assumption.
The obvious question is whether voters would un-
dertake step 3 in significant numbers or not. As such,
we can improve the assumption in step 2 by distribut-
ing the trust the voter has in the WBB amongst mul-
tiple peers. So from a practical point of view there
may be a security benefit to peering the WBB, purely
because voters are unlikely to utilise the full verifia-
bility on offer.
2.6 Vote tabulation, decryption and
export
Votes are marked on the WBB with the day and
polling place they were cast (or confirmed). Poll
workers must check that the number of votes recorded
each day matches the number of people who submit-
ted ballots to be scanned.
After all votes are received, there will be two types
of votes on the WBB: one containing rankings in the
LA section and a single choice in the LC-ATL section,
and the other containing rankings in both the LA
section and the LC-BTL section. For all these votes,
the LA section will be tallied together, but the ATL
votes and BTL votes will be tallied separately.
2.6.1 LA + LC-ATL pre-processing
We take the approach described in [BCH+12] to pro-
cessing the votes. The first type of votes are illus-
trated in Figure 2, where r1, r2, . . . , rk are the ranking
preferences in the LA section (note that the columns
might be in different orders, but the tallying method
will not be affected):
For the above received vote, the onions and their
corresponding rankings in the LA section can be
packed into a single ciphertext using the homomor-
phic property as:
Eˆpk(m) =
k∏
i=1
Eˆpk(M
i−1)ri
where m =
∑k
i=1(ri ×M i−1).
Moreover, for the LC-ATL section, the onion next
to the voter’s mark Epk(β) will be picked out.
LC-BTL votes are preprocessed similarly to LA
votes, except that instead of turning 38 preferences
into one ciphertext we pack the first t preferences into
one ciphertext, then the next t in to a second cipher-
text and so on. Using t = 6 is about the right tradeoff
between reducing data size and reducing discrete log
(dlog) lookup time.
2.6.2 Mixing and tallying the votes
Each type of vote (LA, LC-ATL and LC-BTL) is
mixed separately. Unpacking is done by dlog com-
putation based on a lookup table. LA votes have at
most 10 candidates, so the maximum size of the LA
look-up table is 10! ≈ 222 which is perfectly reason-
able. More than 90% of LC votes are ATL, which is
simply decrypted without any need for a dlog. For
BTL votes, if there are 38 candidates and we pack
every 6 onions into a single ciphertext, the size of the
look-up table is P 386 = 38!/(38 − 6)! ≈ 230. This is
feasible—see Section 2.7 for an estimate of how long
it takes.
2.7 Timing analysis
At the core of the implementation is the Verificatum
Mix-net [Wik12] developed by Douglas Wikstrom.
Verificatum offers both fast and optimised mixing and
decryption as well as efficient proofs. The details of
this implementation and the interface between Verifi-
catum and Preˆt a` Voter are described in Appendix B.
Here we give an estimate of the computation time
required for mixing and decrypting the votes. The
estimate excludes ballot generation, but includes set-
ting up the mixnet, generating the distributed key
shares, mixing the votes, and distributed decrypt-
ing with discrete log lookup. We assume one mixnet
for each of LA, LC-ATL and LC-BTL, with LC-BTL
votes packed as described in Section 2.6.
The timings provided are based on the demo
mixnet settings provided in Verificatum. As such,
this consists of three mix servers with a threshold
of two. The threshold impacts on both the mixing
and decryption phase. For decryption it refers to the
minimum number of mix servers that must be online
in order to successfully decrypt. If all mix servers
are online then all mix servers will be used during
decryption. For mixing this refers to the number of
mix servers that will perform an actual mix. Thus,
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LA LC-ATL
Onion Eˆpk(M
0) Eˆpk(M
1) . . . Eˆpk(M
k−1) Epk(α) Epk(β) Epk(γ)
Marking r1 r2 . . . rk X
Figure 2: LA + LC-ATL votes
the first two mix servers will perform a mix, but the
third will not. Therefore the timings given below for
mixing are for two mix servers, whilst the decryption
is for three. In practice we are likely to use more mix
servers and a higher threshold.
These estimates have been extrapolated from our
testing on Intel Core i7 machines with 8GB RAM
and 1TB Hard Disks. The timings are meant as a
guide rather than scientifically significant evaluations
of time complexity.
The timings are based on a hypothetical district of
100,000 votes. Most of the timings scale linearly as
the size of the election changes. Where that is not
the case we will explicitly state it. Unless otherwise
stated the timings are given in milliseconds. We have
estimated an election with 38 candidates and 8 par-
ties, with 10% of votes being BTL and 90% ATL.
These details are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Scale of example election
Estimate Australian Election
Number of candidates 38
Number of parties 8
Number of ballots 100000
Number of ATL Votes 90000
Number of BTL Votes 10000
Table 2: Timings for example election
100,000 Time in
Ballots Hours
Cipher Generation 142481320 39:34.41
MixingATL 7200000 2
DecryptionATL 729000 0:12.9
MixingBTL
(packing of 6) 5600000 1:33.20
DecryptionBTL 567000 0:9.27
DL Lookup 3430000 0:57.10
Table 2 shows the timings for our example election.
The time for Cipher Generation is clearly the largest.
One of the reasons this is so large is the requirement
to generate enough BTL ciphers for everyone to vote
BTL if they wish. We pre-compute the ciphers and
commit them to the WBB before the start of the
election. As such, we cannot generate new ballots on
the fly. This dramatically increases the amount of en-
cryption that is required during the cipher generation
because we are producing 46 ciphers per ballot.
It is clear to see that the mixing and decryption of
the ATL vote is quite quick. The mixing of the BTL
votes looks equally efficient, however, it should be re-
membered that we assume only 10% of the vote will
be BTL. The efficiency saving of packing the votes is
a factor of 6, without which it would be infeasible to
handle such a large number of candidates in the re-
quired time. The DL Lookup (Discrete Log Lookup)
is extremely quick. This is based on looking up a pre-
computed and sorted table. The demo table handles a
packing of 6 ciphers in 38 and took approximately 15
hours to generate and sort, and is 29GB in size. The
fast lookup time is achieved through optimised mem-
ory and disk caching. We believe the time could im-
proved even further were we to use Solid State Drives
instead of standard hard disks. The lookup can also
be performed in parallel and distributed across mul-
tiple machines if required.
3 Security Analysis
For reasons of space we focus here on the principal
threats, particularly with respect to the key require-
ments of integrity and privacy.
3.1 Security Guarantees of the proto-
col
3.1.1 Integrity for sighted voters
The protocol makes no trust assumptions for in-
tegrity, apart from trusting that each eligible voter
is allowed to cast at most one vote, and that only eli-
gible voters can vote. It does of course rely on voters
to perform some checks, which are detailed in Sec-
tion 2.3. Invalid ballots, in which the candidate list
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doesn’t match the onion, are detected at ballot con-
firmation by Check 1. Check 2 detects incorrect vote
printing by the EBM. Vote substitution by the scan-
ner before WBB submission is detected by Check 3.
Check 4 detects vote substitution by the WBB. Incor-
rect mixing or decryption would be detected because
the proofs of correct mixing and decryption are pub-
lic.
3.1.2 Receipt freeness and privacy
Privacy depends on the assumption that at least one
mix server generates randomness correctly and keeps
it secret. This applies to randomness used in both
ballot construction and tallying. Further, that a
threshold set of those who share the keys is honest.
Provided that the two assumptions hold, the sys-
tem has some defence against kleptographic attacks
on the receipt [GKK+06]. This is because the re-
ceipt’s random data is generated in a distributed way,
and the entities that do the printing (the printer and
the EBM) are deterministic. Thus information can-
not be leaked in the ballot data itself, though it could
be subtly leaked in slight font changes or other print-
ing effects.
There is privacy of the contents of each receipt,
meaning that the tallying protocol does not add any
information about the link between a receipt and its
vote, except whether it was ATL or BTL. The sys-
tem is also receipt-free, meaning that the receipt itself
does not allow a person to prove how she voted.
(However, there are coercion attacks on this pro-
tocol, including the “Italian attack,” which are de-
scribed in Section 3.3).
3.1.3 Integrity in the case of vision-impaired
voters
The vision-impaired voter is unable to do Check 2,
that the EBM printed the correct ballot. She cannot
ask for human assistance without destroying privacy.
This leads to a distribution of trust over the machines
in the polling place: she can check her vote on as
many machines as she likes, and must assume that at
least one of the machines she uses is honest.
3.2 Threats Ameliorated By Procedu-
ral Controls
3.2.1 Integrity
There is potential for ballot stuffing by authenticated
parties. For example, the scanner and the WBB can
both submit ballots that did not originate with vot-
ers. This is mitigated by the pollworkers reconciling
the WBB against the list of attendees as described in
Section 2.6.
Procedures must prevent voters from taking some-
one else’s ballot off the printer and hence voting in
the wrong division.
3.2.2 Privacy
As the voter inputs her choices into the EBM, the
device necessarily “learns” how she voted. The po-
tential for the EBM to leak vote information clearly
raises privacy issues.
Possible countermeasures are to ensure that the
EBM is “stand alone” and oﬄine at least during the
voting phase and is therefore unable to communicate
vote information to other colluding entities. Any data
stored in the EBM’s memory should be deleted, ide-
ally after each session, but at least before the EBM
goes back on-line if this is required for any reason.
Preˆt a` Voter introduces a privacy threat that
does not exist for either standard paper voting or
for DRE’s with VVPAT: someone may discover and
record an unvoted ballot’s candidate order and look
up code, then learn the vote choices when they are
later posted on the WBB. Therefore there should be
procedural controls to protect both the paper print-
out and the electronic data on the printer from ob-
servation by anyone but the voter.
The threat of using the confirmation process to ex-
pose the contents of a ballot that has been voted on
is ameliorated by the electronic locking process de-
scribed in Sec 2.3.2.
Note that the EBM does not learn the look up code
or the onion, so it cannot align votes with receipts
unless the preference ordering is unique (which un-
fortunately, with 30 candidates is possible).
As voters may ask for assistance at any point dur-
ing the ceremony, there is still a chance that an official
may make a connection between candidate order and
look-up code. This threat to privacy however, exists
in the current system.
3.3 Threats Remaining: general vot-
ing ceremony
We now discuss remaining threats to the system.
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3.3.1 The general voting ceremony
An analysis of the system was carried out by a walk-
through, assessing the potential for known threats
against actions required of the voter, officials and ma-
chinery and the interactions between them [KSW05,
RP05].
There are possible threats to coercion, such as
forced randomisation, where a coercer demands the
ballot to be filled out in a particular order, effectively
producing a random vote. For FPTP elections, the
voter could keep confirming ballots until she finds
one that satisfies the coercer, at the same time al-
lowing her to vote as she wishes. This is infeasible
in complex voting systems such as this, though it
might let the voter choose her first preference. Co-
ercion to vote above the line is possible, but unlikely
to have any political consequences. We have already
mentioned the“Italian attack”. Although this exists
in the current system, it is perhaps exacerbated by
publishing the vote, rather than releasing it only to a
small number of trusted organisations, which is cur-
rent practice.
The possibility exists for an official to learn voter’s
choice if she asks for assistance in the booth.
If the voter leaves the polling place with the RHS
of her voting slip, she could prove how she voted.
This problem in Preˆt a` Voter has already been noted.
Unfortunately, having dummy and discarded RHS
freely available at the polling station as previously
suggested, will not work here. With preference vot-
ing, especially with a large number of preferences and
if the attacker demands an unusual ranking, there is
only a tiny chance that a coerced voter will find a
suitable RHS among the dummy/discarded slips.
It is important that destruction of the RHS is en-
forced, and that the voter does this before she leaves
the privacy of the booth. Even then, there is still
a possibility she may capture her RHS on a mobile
device.
A possible alternative is to provide facilities for vot-
ers to generate “pseudo” RHS’s. A coercer would not
then be able to rely on the voter’s complicity. Admit-
tedly, this adds further complexity to the system, and
is not being actively considered for the VEC system.
“Psychological” attacks are a potential threat. As
an example, a coercer manages to convince voters
that he is able to decrypt their receipts and find out
how they voted [RP05]. Voter education could mit-
igate this attack; however psychological attacks will
be a problem for virtually any end-to-end verifiable
system.
Chain voting is a possibility in Preˆt a` Voter, includ-
ing this version. This problem exists already in the
ordinary paper voting system, and is not regarded by
the VEC as a significant threat.
3.3.2 The case of the vision impaired voter
In addition to the previously noted threats, a vi-
sion impaired voter may be vulnerable to an eaves-
dropper learning her choice if the audio feature is
faulty/corrupt. There is a greater risk of an official
learning the voter’s choice. Arguably, a vision im-
paired voter is more likely to ask for assistance during
the ceremony. There is greater trust in the machin-
ery performing as intended than for sighted voters.
A blind voter will be relying on voice prompts to
perform the ceremony correctly. There are no easy
solutions to these problems and again, security has
to be offset against system requirements.
3.4 Other issues
We finally draw attention to other positive properties
of the system.
There is robustness against less than a threshold
of authorities stopping the protocol. This ensures
that a result will always be output. The mix servers
do not need any secret information to do the shuf-
fle. Hence if some of them are absent or refuse to
perform the shuﬄe, they can simply be replaced or
even ignored. The threshold of honest tellers ensures
decryption will always be properly carried out. The
robustness assumption for the WBB should also be
addressed by distributed implementation.
There is accountability for receipt misrecording.
Voter checking of the signature on their receipts in
the polling place should detect malicious behaviour
on the part of the scanner or WBB.
Finally, the system provides evidence of malfea-
sance: if the voter has a properly-signed receipt that
does not appear on the WBB, she can prove it.
4 Conclusion
One lesson from our attempt to adapt Preˆt a` Voter to
a real election is that not all issues can be perfectly
addressed in a way that retains usability and com-
putational feasibility. This system has unconditional
integrity but does introduce some coercion possibil-
ities that do not exist for paper voting. The design
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problem is to identify and address the issues that re-
ally are important and easy enough to address; the
political problem is to maintain honesty about the
ones that remain.
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Figure 3: A slip example—the back face
A Signature Attacks
Here we explain signature attacks (a.k.a. “Italian At-
tacks”), why we did not address them in this project,
and how we could do so in future. Any election with
a complex ballot is vulnerable. In preferential elec-
tions, a coercer can instruct a voter to cast a partic-
ular signature vote (i.e. a particular permutation of
candidates) and then check to see whether it appears
in the final tally. Since the number of possible votes
14
(around 30! in this case) is much greater than the
number of votes actually cast, a coerced vote is un-
likely to appear unless the voter obeys. The system
described in this paper ends with complete decryp-
tion of all the Preˆt a` Voter votes, and so it does not
address this attack.
Victorian LC elections currently use a naive (non-
cryptographic) e-counting system. First the votes are
entered into the system through manual data entry.
Then the counting system checks for invalid votes and
counts the valid votes.
A concern with the existing e-counting system is
that the result is not universally verifiable. To help
address this problem election administrators are con-
sidering publishing all the vote data to facilitate pub-
lic verification of the counting software. (Note this
still leaves verification gaps, for instance in the data
entry process and the filtering of invalid votes.) The
dilemma is that publishing the vote data makes it
possible to carry out signature attacks.
Recently several cryptographic STV counting
schemes have been proposed to improve vote secrecy
whilst also providing universal verifiability [Hea07,
Wen10, BMN+09]. However their high computa-
tional and communication cost would make them in-
feasible for our application. Moreover the proposed
schemes are for simplified versions of STV, and would
need substantial changes to adapt them to the STV
variant used in Victorian LC elections. Such modi-
fications would likely reduce vote secrecy and/or in-
crease the complexity costs. Also the schemes in the
literature perform only the counting and do not pro-
cess invalid votes.
So although cryptographic counting is desirable, it
may not be feasible in the short term. Also, if the
conventional paper votes are published, then a co-
ercer could simply demand that coerced voters use
conventional paper voting instead. Hence it seems
that the most practical approach for now is to con-
tinue the use of naive e-counting, despite the risk of
signature attacks. The encrypted votes cast via the
e-voting system will be mixed and decrypted to pub-
licly reveal the plaintext votes. These will then be
combined with the conventional votes and fed into
the e-counting system.
This issue is worth revisiting if all the LC-BTL
votes are ever cast by computer, or if there is reason
to believe that signature attacks are being performed.
B Implementation details
This section describes in detail the use of Verifica-
tum. The selection of Verificatum as the mix-net in-
fluences other implementation decisions. We will use
Verificatum to generate the joint public key, and cor-
responding private key shares. Ballot generation and
collection will be performed in bespoke components
as will the tallying of the decrypted votes. As such,
we need to interface with Verificatum to retrieve the
public key data and group description needed during
the construction of the ballot ciphers and the dis-
crete log look-up table required for efficient mixing.
In this section we will provide more details about how
the implementation will be undertaken and provide
an estimate of timings for various different sizes of
mix.
B.1 Setting up the mix-net
Prior to being able to generate the joint keys in Verifi-
catum we have to undertake some configuration steps.
This involves selection of the group we are going to be
operating over, the IP address of the machines in the
mix-net, relevant SSH login information and various
mixing options. The process is initially performed on
each individual mix server before they then run a pro-
tocol to jointly agree on the protocol properties. We
will use a group with a 4096bit modulus and 256bit
subgroup.
B.2 Key Generation
The keys for the mix-net will be generated using
Verificatum. The Verificatum key generation pro-
duces a distributed key where each share is then
threshold shared through a verifiable secret sharing
scheme. Full details of the key generation are
available in Verificatum, a summary is provided at
http://www.verificatum.org/verificatum/prot.html.
Full details of the key generation are available on
Verificatum website [Wik12].
B.3 Cipher Generation and Candi-
date Identifiers
Having constructed a key pair in Verificatum we ex-
tract the public key for use by the Election Man-
ager. For efficiency reasons we will construct three
instances of the Verificatum mix-net. Each will be
entirely independent and thus have its set of keys.
The reason for doing this is to allow us to perform
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one mix for the lower house, one for the upper house
ATL votes and one for the upper house BTL votes.
The following stages will be performed for each of
sub-elections. Where a different process is followed
we will highlight it, otherwise the same process is
performed three times. Again, for efficiency reasons
these three runs of the Election Manager may be per-
formed in parallel. The Election Manager is the com-
ponent that will perform the cipher generation. The
Election Manager should be run on a diskless work-
station and be observed by independent observers.
The first step for the Election Manager is to con-
struct the candidate identifiers. For the ATL ciphers
the Election Manager randomly selects elements from
the group which the key was constructed over. These
identifiers are recorded next to each candidates name.
In the case where vote packing is being used, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.6, the candidate identifier is cal-
culated based on the maximum ranking. Once the
candidate identifiers have been created they are pub-
licly committed to on the WBB.
Ballot ciphertexts are generated as described in
Section 2.2. Each ballot also requires a serial num-
ber, to enable the submissions to be identified on the
WBB during verification. The serial number need
not be random or unpredictable. However, if the
Election Manager is being run in parallel it is im-
portant that there is no overlap between the different
sub-elections. As such, the serial number will con-
sist of a prefix indicating the election that it is for
(LA, LC-ATL or LC-BTL) and a sequential index.
The permutation of the candidate names is sent for
printing along with the serial number and a digitally
signed copy of the serial number. This is signed using
the Election Managers private signing key. The per-
muted cipher texts are committed to the WBB along
with the relevant serial number. It is important to
note that the digital signature of the serial number is
not committed to the WBB. It should only appear on
the actual printed ballot and is a safeguard against a
rogue machine attempting to ballot stuff.
B.4 Vote Submission and WBB
The front-end submission of votes has already been
covered in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. whilst a design for
the WBB has been provided in Section 2.5. For com-
pleteness we will mention that the WBB will issue a
digital signature for the submitted vote. The voter
must check that both the vote preferences are correct
and that the correct serial numbers are included in
this signature.
B.5 Vote Verification on the WBB
The voter takes their voting receipt home and can
then check the presence of their vote on the WBB
once the WBB has committed to its contents, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.5. To check the presence of the
vote the voter must enter their relevant serial num-
ber into the relevant box on the WBB screen. At
this point the WBB will retrieve the submitted infor-
mation and relevant signatures. It will display this
information to the voter so they can both verify the
presence of it and check the contents are unchanged.
B.6 WBB Export and Mixing
Prior to being able to run the votes through the Ver-
ificatum mix-net they need to be exported from the
WBB. This will be a publicly available option. When
exporting the ATL votes the submitted preferences
are mapped to the corresponding cipher texts. The
cipher texts are then ordered by preference and put
into a column-wise structure. The ballots are com-
bined in a row-wise structure. With votes that are
being packed the relevant vote packing strategy must
be performed and committed to publicly. This vote
packing can be performed by each mix-net individ-
ually or just once centrally and committed to the
WBB. Again, the ciphers for each ballot are organ-
ised into columns and each ballot is represented by a
row.
Each mix-net server needs its own copy of the
ciphers that are being submitted to the first mix.
We assume that pre-configuration steps have already
been performed by the mix-net, since these would
need to have been done in order to generate the keys
used during cipher generation. The mix servers then
commence the mixing protocol. During the run the
other mix servers check the proofs produced by each
other, as such when the mixing phase completes the
proofs have already been checked by the mix servers.
At this stage an independent check of the proofs can
take place or the decryption process can be started.
The output of the decryption service is a list of either
plain texts in preference order or values to lookup in
the discrete log table. The output and the proof in-
formation from each mix server is committed to the
WBB.
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